

“Centrifugal and Centripetal Forces in Euro Area Banking Integration”

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European Stability Mechanism



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I. Centrifugal forces

“Market driven” ?

General uncertainties regarding the banking business...



Note: cumulative returns of DE/US 10 year yields, Gold, EUR vis-à-vis CHF, JPY, NOK, euro area consumer goods vis-à-vis the index and high US dividend firms vis-à-vis S&P 500

Latest observation: 4 March 2013

Source: Bloomberg, ESM calculations

I. Centrifugal forces


With questions arising from P/B values: lack of trust? What is in the closet?

		Total	Mean P/B value
Country	# of Large Banks	Market cap. (EUR million)	2013
UK	5	334.2	0.8x
France	3	91.6	0.5x
Germany	2	39.4	0.4x
Netherlands	2	34.4	0.9x
Italy	4	47.8	0.3x
Spain	2	99.4	0.8x

Source: Rothschild, Feb. 2013

I. Centrifugal forces

... in times of stress are compounded by questions about “asset quality” and RWAs in different jurisdictions.




- Initial GC dif
- B-Type dif
- Benchmark

20 largest banks. Blue dots are initial “Global Charge (RWA + EL (expected losses) over Exposure at default). Red dots are what is left “unexplained” after taking into account the type of method in use (SA or IRB) and the portfolio composition. Around half of the difference is not explained by these factors.

Source: EBA (2013) “Interim results of the EBA review of the consistency of RWA”.

I. Centrifugal forces


Liquidity hoarding



I. Centrifugal forces

... all topped up by the sovereign debt crisis ... with feedback loops with the banking sector

Asymmetries in bond market volatility - 10-year government bond rates



Note: Annualised 22 days rolling volatility. Vertical lines on 29 February 2012 for LTRO2 and 6 September for the announcement of the OMT.

Latest observation: 4 March 2013


Source: Datastream and ESM calculations

II. Consequences

Malfunctioning of interbank market not conducive to cross-border (banking) flows. (cross border banking was not only about retail banking in other countries)

In the GIIPS, Eurosystem flows are the only source of capital, as private creditors and investors have been withdrawing for the last three years

GIIPS² capital inflows
\$ billion, constant 2011 exchange rate



¹ Includes inflows via EFSF/ESM, bond purchase programs, and the TARGET2 system.

² GIIPS comprises Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

³ Non-annualized total inflows up to 3Q12.

SOURCE: ECB, individual central bank balance sheets; Eurostat; press releases; McKinsey Global Institute analysis

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II. Consequences

...and cross-border divestments play a significant role

Banks worldwide have divested \$722 billion of assets since 2007, with more than half coming from European banks

Divestitures, January 2007–December 2012¹

Nationality	Examples	Cumulative deal value \$ billion (number of deals)	Cross-border % of cumulative deal value
United Kingdom	RBS HSBC Standard Chartered BARCLAYS	161.8 (308)	55
France	CREDIT AGRICOLE BNP PARIBAS SOCIETE GENERALE	79.9 (208)	62
Spain	BBVA Santander	77.3 (215)	45
Italy	INTESA SANPAOLO UniCredit Bank	43.1 (234)	14
Germany	COMMERZBANK Deutsche Bank	24.4 (222)	52
Belgium	KBC DEXIA	21.0 (44)	63
Total Western Europe²		434.5 (1,499)	51
United States	JPMorgan Chase Citi Bank of America	167.6 (655)	42
Rest of world		120.0 (1,296)	26
Total		722.1 (3,450)	45

¹ Includes retail and commercial banks. Deal value of some divestitures not reported.

² We found data on 23 divestiture deals of Swiss banks. The six deals with values total less than \$1 billion.


SOURCE: Dealogic; McKinsey Global Institute analysis

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II. Consequences

... with banks' willingness to lend being different in different countries

Changes in credit standards applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises.
(net percentages of banks contributing to tightening credit standards)




Source: ECB and national central banks

Note: Net percentages are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding "tightened considerably" and "tightened somewhat" and the sum of the percentages of banks responding "eased somewhat" and "eased considerably".

II. Consequences

... while different costs of funding (among other reasons) impair the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and hence euro area financial integration...

Interest rates: Loans to small and medium sized enterprises



Latest observation: December 2012
Source: ECB and ESM calculations


III. Why is this important?

- **Comparative share of banking credit in overall credit in euro area vs. US (70/30, 30/70)**
- **It's not only about cross-border banking**
 - Balance of payments financing within euro area
 - Monetary policy transmission mechanism
 - No “euro area risk-free” asset
- **Fragmented financial system along national lines:**
 - Precludes efficient risk-taking
 - Facilitates sudden stops because of home bias inherent in the system
 - Fails to reap the benefits of monetary union


IV. Centripetal forces

- “Policy-driven”?
- Macro adjustment is underway

Current Account Balance (as % of GDP)



Fiscal balance, Euro area vs USA and Japan (as % of GDP)



— Germany — Ireland — Greece
— Portugal — Spain — Italy

Source: EC European Economic Forecast - Winter 2013

IV. Centripetal forces

- **Market developments followed by policy developments in the financial sphere:**
 - Coordinated guarantees framework
 - Coordinated DGS up to €100 K
 - European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
 - European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, ESMA, EIOPA)
 - EFSF (temporary mechanism)
 - ECB's LTRO
 - Single rule-book

IV. Centripetal forces (policy-driven)

- **Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)**
- **ESM (permanent mechanism, combined lending capacity with EFSF of €700 bn, 7.4 % of euro area GDP)**
 - Loans to sovereigns
 - Precautionary credit lines
 - Primary market purchases
 - Secondary market purchases
 - Indirect recapitalisation of financial institutions
 - When SSM is in place, direct recapitalisation of financial institutions is a possibility
- **Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)**
- **Next banking union steps under discussion: DGS and bank resolution regime**

IV. Conclusion

- **Macro adjustment is underway – should support “reintegration”**
- **Policies are supporting “Reintegration”**
- **SSM is a cornerstone in the “reintegration process”**
- **EFSF/ESM is supporting (and will support) this process by providing financial assistance, including to financial institutions (indirectly, and when agreed by MS, directly)**
- **Next steps for coherent banking union needed (DGS/resolution) and work is underway.**

Thank you

